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A Tenuous Bond:
Th e Formative Other as a Tiny Neuron
Mitsuko Masuda
I. Introduction: Th e Other as a Key Concept
On November 21–23, 1985, the International Symposium on Richard 
Wright was held at the University of Mississippi. It was the ﬁ rst international 
conference on a major black writer in the United States. Th e brochure: “Mis-
sissippi’s Native Son: An International Symposium on Richard Wright 
(1908–1960),” distributed before the symposium, pointed out the impor-
tance of synthetic studies on Richard Wright (3). During the years since the 
Wright Symposium, Wright studies have moved forward. Nevertheless, a syn-
thetic study of Richard Wright has yet to be completed. Unsuccessfully, the 
groping way of synthesizing the paradigm of problems in the study of Wright 
has never gone beyond what George Kent, one of his most sympathetic critics, 
sketched out. Kent pointed out the need for 1) more biographical and biblio-
graphical studies, 2) a deﬁ nitive standard edition of Wright’s works, 3) full-
length studies on Wright’s reading, of his use of the social sciences, and of his 
relations with the Communist Party, and 4) brief studies on Wright’s psychol-
ogy, his development of character, the “eﬀ ectiveness of style in relation to in-
tention,” naturalism in his works, his inﬂ uence on other writers, reevaluations 
of his short stories, novels, autobiography, poetry, non-ﬁ ction, and compara-
tive studies of published works with manuscript versions (98–103). It can be 
said that separately each one of these four items is on the way to being accom-
plished by such Wright scholars as Michel Fabre, Addison Gayle, Margaret 
Walker, and Keneth Kinnamon; how to integrate all these aspects of Wright 
studies, however, has never been pursued by any critic. Ineﬀ ectively, I have 
been groping the way of synthesizing the paradigm of problems in the study 
of Wright; however, Wright studies seem tho have totally gone beyond what 
has been supposed before. While the paradigm of problems in the study of 
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Wright has been studied by many scholars, none of them seems ever to have 
suited my concerns. My greatest concern is whether there can be any speciﬁ c 
way to feel closer to Wright and to share his mentality. In other words, while 
searching for the way to synthesize the study of Richard Wright, in eﬀ ect, I 
have just intended to get rid of my defeated feelings caused by Wright’s work. 
In the process of analyzing the message of Th e Outsider and Wright’s existen-
tialism, a method in order to bridge the immense gap between Wright and I is 
naturally led; it is structuralism.
Structuralism as a literary criticism was developed out of Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s theory of language; it is based primarily on the distinction that 
Saussure made between langue, or language as a system (or structure) of diﬀ er-
ences, and parole, or individual speech acts. For Saussure language is a system 
of signs, and the sign is arbitrary; the whole of language is a system of diﬀ er-
ence. Th e system of diﬀ erence applied by Saussure analogizes with the existen-
tial deﬁ nition of the Being of a human being. Existentialism is a twentieth-
century philosophy which deals with the Being of a human being as existence; 
the meaning and content of existence, however, is dependent upon the indi-
vidual existentialist such as Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and so on. Although all of these use the same 
word existence to signify the Being of a human being, the concept of existence 
depends upon each philosopher. Accordingly, there seems to be a tendency to 
recognize existentialism as a philosophy that has no universals. Is existential-
ism so extremely personal as to suppose that each human being signiﬁ es his or 
her own existence as existence valid only for himself or herself? Existentialism 
is not, does not. A human being depends, for his or her existence, on others’ 
existence. We can deﬁ ne our existence only by what is not that of others. Th ere 
is no essence to our existence; existence is the essence to a human being. Th e 
validity to apply structuralism, whose concepts of ‘diﬀ erentiation’ and ‘arbi-
trariness’ can be considered equivalent to the concept of the Other in existen-
tialism, to a synthetic study of Richard Wright will be indicated.
Wright’s relation to existentialism has been focused on, commented on, and 
criticized since 1946, when he ﬁ rst visited France. Naturally, at ﬁ rst, Wright’s 
impression of French existentialism, his relation to the French existentialists, 
including Jean-Paul Sartre, and points of comparison and contrast between 
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Wright and them were dealt with. Although I count 144 items of those com-
mentaries and criticisms which have been written about Wright’s existential-
ism, many as late as 2007, most of them are still within the framework of the 
earlier trends. Th ey have followed Constance Webb’s way of discussing in her 
“Notes Preliminary to a Full Study of the Work of Richard Wright,” (1946) 
and remain simply a comparison rather than a search for his originality. None-
theless, in his aptly titled “Wright and the French Existentialists,” Michel 
Fabre, in a discussion of Richard Wright’s existentialism, summarizes its 
signiﬁ cant meanings in Wright’s novels (159). Arguing that Wright was an 
existentialist long before he heard the word, Fabre analyzes Wright’s social, 
literary, and political contacts with Camus, Sartre, and de Beauvoir. I share 
Fabre’s assurance that Wright’s interest in existentialism was not perfunctory, 
and that there are some similarities between Wright’s existentialism and the 
existentialism of some others but that for the most part they are diﬀ erent. 
Wright’s interest in existentialism was not perfunctory; it is necessary for us 
focus on the various existential issues such as existence, freedom, environ-
ment, the Other, dread, death, the bet, God. However, it can be said that all 
of these existential issues should be examined in terms of the Other as Albert 
Camus asserts in Th e Myth of Sisyphus (33), Simone de Beauvoir in Th e Second 
Sex (248–53), Søren Kierkegaard in Sickness unto Death (13–14), Friedrich 
Nietzsche in Th e Gay Science (92–93), Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and Nothing-
ness (303–33), and Martin Heidegger in Being and Time. (162). According to 
Martin Heidegger, the Being of a human being always exists with and towards 
the Other as long as it is Dasein [the Being of a human being]; it obtains in 
one’s relationship with the Other.
Needless to say, the Other is deﬁ ned as an existential term in this paper, 
operating as a self-contained system of diﬀ erence. Th e Other signiﬁ es the 
other person or another person or persons, one’s environment, one’s situation, 
indeed even whatever within oneself causes one to sense or question his or her 
existence or identity or self. Accordingly, the term the Other in this paper 
encompasses either a singular other or a plural others. Th e existential structure 
of the protagonists’ psychology, a structure through which they must always 
identify those people and that outside themselves with the Other, the entity 
which inevitably exists in relationships to their [protagonists’] Being and to 
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their selves, will be clariﬁ ed. Nonetheless, the Other is not always deﬁ ned as 
that person or thing opposing oneself. Th e Other does not make a deﬁ nitive 
interpretation of Wright’s writings, but it shows openness to diﬀ erent inter-
pretation of Wright’s writings. Th e Other as a key concept is not a ﬁ xed but a 
ﬂ uid one; that is, it may be deﬁ ned as a movement or a function rather than 
as a concept. Accordingly, it is fair to say that the Other is deﬁ ned as such 
because or as long as it is not fathomable and is recognized as undeﬁ nable. 
Wright’s text is independent of Wright, the reader, and external reality, but it 
is dependent on the systematical interrelationship which relates each one of 
these to any other or to all of these. Wright’s text is seen here as an objective 
structure undergirded by the interrelationship of all these aspects or realiza-
tion of the Other.
Of course, fear, hate, pride, and shame discussed in this paper are peculiar 
to an individual who lives his or her individual life; they, however, are dealt 
with here as signs in order to show the way how organically they are related 
one another in terms of the Other. What I attempt to do in this paper is to 
illuminate Wright’s existential literary world and to discuss a part of the pos-
sibility of forming a tenuous bond that bridges the immense gap between 
Richard Wright and the reader, focusing on Native Son, from the standpoint 
of the Other, one of the key concepts both in existentialism in the sphere of 
philosophy and in structuralism in the sphere of literary criticism.
II. Bigger Th omas as an Existential Hero
Native Son was invariably described as a protest novel during the ﬁ rst 25 
years after the book ﬁ rst appeared in 1940. Th e aims of the novel of protest are 
generally understood to be to reveal injustice, to communicate information 
usually suppressed and, above all, to arouse the reader’s emotion, so that the 
need for action will be strongly felt. Th ere is no doubt that Wright had these 
aims in mind in the making of Native Son. Nevertheless, during the second 25 
years since its ﬁ rst publication, it has been acknowledged that Wright’s power 
as an artist far transcends this consideration. It seems safe to say that the 
novel has been thoroughly re-evaluated; it has sometimes been characterized 
as an existentialist novel, for example, as suggested in Curmie E. Price’s poem 
“Th e Ballad of Bigger Th omas” (1969) on the violence in Native Son and its 
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relation to existentialism:
Bigger than your doubt, Th omas,
the sensible world beats its head
against city streets, trying
to make sense of your existential act.
Now that we’re talking debts,
let’s admit it: Camus’ Meursault
owes something to Wright’s Th omas,
who taught them all the exaltation
of violence in a contingent world.
Oh yes, yes; I’ve heard of Sartre, 
Genet, and the absurd; just yesterday,
however, lost in Native Son, I had put
my ﬁ st through a gray world before I knew it.
Call it instinct, mammoth expectations.
Bigger Th omas rides again along
the tributes of my thoughts. (48)
At the end of this section, we will see in what way Camus’s Meursault owes 
something to Wright’s Bigger.
Bigger’s ordained consequence, incarnated in his relationship to other char-
acters, the elements of setting, and the series of events conceptualized also as 
the Other, which lead to his imprisonment, illuminate him as an existential 
hero. Th e structure of Bigger’s existentialist character is realized in terms of the 
Other. Although Bigger, in fact, belongs to the black community, he has pride 
and is articulate regarding his perception of the white world as the Other be-
cause of that pride. His pride, nevertheless, is not suﬃ  cient in its strength to 
shake oﬀ  his shame as reﬂ ected in this assertion of its limitation by Sartre in 
Being and Nothingness that: 
Pride does not exclude original shame. In fact it is on the ground of fun-
damental shame or shame of being an object that pride is built. It is an 
ambiguous feeling. In pride I recognize the Other as the subject through 
whom my being gets its object-state, but I recognize as well that I myself 
am also responsible for my object-ness. I emphasize my responsibility 
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and I assume it. In one sense therefore pride is at ﬁ rst resignation; in 
order to be proud of being that, I must of necessity ﬁ rst resign myself to 
being only that. (386)
Even though Bigger’s pride is a feeling without equilibrium, and it is a reaction 
of bad faith, it is by this pride that Bigger assumes his responsibility and is 
deﬁ ned by his need to struggle with an extremely determined deﬁ nition of the 
self by the Other. Needless to say, the white world is the very essence of the 
Other for Bigger, but that isn’t all.
Th e beginning scenes of the novel make manifest what becomes a most 
requisite element of Bigger’s personality: the interelationship between his 
strong fear, hate, pride, shame, and the Other. Bigger’s fear, hate, pride, and 
shame, which are clearly evident when we ﬁ rst meet him, are more explicitly 
realized in his interaction with his family and gang as the Other in Book One; 
Sartre, for example, explains fear, pride and shame as the original reactions 
toward the Other: “Shame, fear and pride are my original reactions; they are 
only various ways by which I recognize the Other as a subject beyond reach, 
and they include within them a comprehension of my selfness which can and 
must serve as my motivation for constituting the Other as an object” (387). 
Bigger tries to shake oﬀ  his strong fear and shame, in order to be responsible 
for his actions; and ﬁ nally he, in Book Two, is motivated to rebelliousness by 
wishing to be recognized by those who are the Other or to be integrated into 
them without being humiliated by them. Bigger, who at the beginning of 
Book Th ree is awakened, is fundamentally described in terms of the Other as 
done by Sartre:
It is by thrusting myself toward my possibles that I shall escape fear to the 
extent that I shall consider my object-ness as non-essential. Th is can 
happen only if I apprehend myself as being responsible for the Other’s 
being. Th e Other becomes then that which I make myself not-be, and his 
possibilities are possibilities which I refuse and which I can simply con-
template — hence dead-possibilities. (383)
Fear, which proves to be as strong an element of Bigger’s personality as his 
pride, Martin Heidegger also succinctly summarizes in his Being and Time in 
terms of the Other:
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In one’s concern with what one has taken hold of, whether with, for, or 
against, the Others, there is constant care as to the way one diﬀ ers from 
them, whether that diﬀ erence is merely one that is to evened out, wheth-
er one’s own Dasein has lagged behind the Others and wants to catch up 
in relationship to them, or whether one’s Dasein already has some prior-
ity over them and sets out to keep them suppressed. Th e care about this 
distance between them is disturbing to Being-with-one-another [Da-
sein], though this disturbance is one that is hidden from it. If we may 
express this existentially, such Being-with-one-another has the character 
of distantiality. (163–64)
Th e entity Heidegger denotes by the term “Dasein” is the Being of a human 
being. According to Heidegger, this quality of being “disturbing” is character-
istic of the existential hero who primordially has distantiality. What is here 
expressed by “disturbing” can be concretely explained as fear:
Th at which fear fears about is that very entity which is afraid — Dasein. 
Only an entity for which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can 
beafraid. [ . . . ]
One can also fear about Others, and we then speak of “fearing for” 
them [Fürchten für sie]. Th is fearing for the Other does not take away his 
fear. Such possibility has been ruled out already, because the Other, for 
whom we fear, need not fear at all on his part. It is precisely when the 
Other is not afraid and charges recklessly at what is threatening him that 
we fear most for him. (180–81)
Wright begins Native Son at a point when the elements of his hero’s distan-
tiality from the Other have already conspired to bring about Bigger’s ultimate 
fear. As the title of Book One implies, Bigger most often becomes completely 
enwrapped by fear when he is confronted with the white world or with 
merely a suggestion of confrontation. Th e seeds of Bigger’s dread seem to be 
rooted in his diﬀ erence from both the black and the white worlds, a diﬀ erence 
which has led him to conceive of them as the Other. Consequently, quite 
early on, in Book One, Bigger’s distance from the Other, including both the 
black and white communities, becomes the essential element of the dramatic 
action through which Bigger’s characterization unfolds. His distantiality from 
the Other, or the distance from the Other, is organically related to Bigger’s 
fear, hate, pride, and shame.
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Native Son ends lightened brieﬂ y by the moment when Bigger becomes 
aware of the structure of his existence, which can only be understood from a 
realization of the Other: his family, his black community, the white world, 
and both black and white women. Nevertheless, although they ironically turn 
out to have been the irresistible Other for Bigger, at the same time he never 
wants to be one of the Other; he feels diﬀ erentiality toward them; he can 
never merge into them even if he wanted to. Bigger’s “faint, wry, bitter smile” 
(850) after saying good-bye to Max suggests Bigger’s diﬀ erentiality toward 
himself. Bigger is absolutely an Other toward himself. Bigger’s otherness 
reminds us of Camus’s assertion: “For ever I shall be a stranger to myself,” 
(Camus Th e Myth of Sisyphus 24) which is a basic idea of his absurdity. Bigger 
world’s exactly proves the validity of Camus’s absurdity:
Th is world in itself is not reasonable, that is all that can be said. But what 
is absurd is the confrontation of the irrational and the wild longing for 
clarity whose call echoes in the human heart. Th e absurd depends as 
much on man as on the world. For the moment it is all that links them 
together. It binds them one to the other as only hatred can weld two 
creatures together. (Th e Myth of Sisyphus 26)
Absurdity as a unique linkage with the Other is seen in Bigger’s world. 
Furthermore, Bigger’s rebellion, which ends leaving some possibility of living 
together with the Other, reminds one of Camus’s predication of rebellion: 
“Man’s solidarity is founded upon rebellion, and rebellion can only be justiﬁ ed 
by this solidarity” (Th e Rebel 27). Bigger is an existential hero, whose existence 
is deﬁ ned by the Other and who has been living and who now will die in the 
absurd world. It is clear that Wright recognized the absurdity of existence 
represented in Camus’s Meursault before meeting Camus in the autumn of 
1947. Nevertheless, at the same time, we are surprised once again at Curmie 
E. Price’s acuity that “Meursault owes something to Wright’s Th omas.”
Th e powerful messages expressed in Native Son, ﬁ rst, too strongly defeat the 
reader for him or her to recover; second, they pose a question of what the 
world in which we live is all about. Th e reader, initially depressed by Bigger’s 
brutality and the peculiarities of his world and feeling that he or she can have 
nothing in common, may unexpectedly ﬁ nd a common ground in his or her 
world and Bigger’s when he or she looks into Bigger’s world in terms of the 
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Other. Th e world itself is one; there is no essence to Bigger’s world as well as 
to anybody’s world; there only exist certain diﬀ erences between the former 
and the latter or in the former’s relation to the latter. Once the structure of 
Bigger’s psychology is clariﬁ ed in terms of the Other, the reader can objec-
tively read Bigger’s story, calmly analyze, and feel himself or herself as an 
Other who lives in their common world.
III. Conclusion: Richard Wright’s Existential World
Wright’s existentialism is undergirded by ‘diﬀ erentiation’ and ‘arbitrariness’ 
in his various relationships to the world: his relationship to things, to himself, 
to the Other, and so on. Wright’s existentialism operates as an intermediary 
between his writing and his life. Th e richness of his literary experiences results 
from his extraordinary way of struggling in order to reveal the unexpectedly 
complicated and mutually restrictive psychological structure between his rela-
tionships to the Other and to himself. For Richard Wright, to discover his self 
simultaneously means to discover the distance between himself and the world, 
and between himself and the Other who lives there; his discovery is accompa-
nied by ambivalent feelings such as his relief and discouragement, joy and 
sorrow, astonishment and strangeness. Th ese ambivalent feelings, violently 
expressed in Native Son, are objectively or sometimes cynically described in 
Black Boy when Wright casts back his life and analyzes his psychological struc-
ture in terms of the Other as a narrator, likening his psychological structure to 
young Richard’s. Although it is doubtful whether Wright had been granted 
enough time to mature by the time he wrote Th e Outsider, the reader can sense 
calmness and ease ﬂ owing in the depths of the context. Th is calmness and ease 
signal Wright’s generosity toward the Other, but they never signify indiﬀ er-
ence and resignation toward them. Richard Wright never gives up living his 
life among the troublesome Other and continues to write to ﬁ nd an answer to 
the psychological, sociological, and philosophical question of his Being as a 
human being. Richard Wright’s literary world, in my opinion, will be deﬁ ned 
as his challenge to the impossible, that a human being always must transcend 
his or her self and must live in a world where anything always exists as it is and 
where the Other, as well as one, also tries to transcend his or her self.
Th e world of Richard Wright is structured in the relations among the 
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reader, the protagonists, the other characters, the narrator, and Wright. 
Whether the relations are racial or non-racial is not the point; whether 
Wright’s existentialism is racial or no-racial is not the point. Th e underlying 
structure of Wright’s world and his existentialism is the relation itself. Further, 
the Other will be a key concept to narrow, reduce, and bridge the gap between 
Wright and the reader. It seems to be indispensable for the reader, living in a 
thoroughly diﬀ erent world from Wright’s, to keep the mutual relationship 
between him or her and Wright open, ﬂ uid, in order to realize what is Wright’s 
true self.
Wright’s works primarily interest the reader in the racial destiny of black 
Americans and his life as a black American. In general, his life seems to be well 
revealed. I, nevertheless, notice in his texts that his works, his stories, and his 
characters show another aspect of Wright’s life; they uncover Wright’s con-
sciously or unconsciously strong commitment to the Other. His imaginative 
writing is his challenge to the world and to himself to express his strong will 
to recognize, comply with, and overcome those who are the Other even if they 
violate his freedom. Accordingly, the Other could be a theme not only for 
knowing Wright’s existentialism, but also for understanding the world of 
Richard Wright as our own.
It is likely that there are many readers who are inclined to bury any thought 
of Richard Wright after having been defeated and puzzled by the brutality of 
Native Son and seeing their world ﬁ lled with dread certainly haunted all their 
days. Such readers who feel that their superﬁ cial sense of justice cannot be any 
match for Richard Wright’s seem to have lost their power to consider the rea-
son why Wright needed such brutality. Th at such brutality can only resuscitate 
the Other, who was going to die, is rather easily understood by reading Black 
Boy and rereading Native Son in terms of the Other; and, ﬁ nally, the signiﬁ -
cance of murder which revives the Other is clariﬁ ed by Th e Outsider. Nonethe-
less, unfortunately, it seems to be diﬃ  cult to hope that the reader, who may 
have already been suﬀ ocated by Native Son, will read the other works of Rich-
ard Wright. Once the reader tries to experience his or her self as an Other to 
Richard Wright when he or she reads Wright’s works, it is very easy to imagine 
that it would have been almost suﬀ ocating for Wright himself to write those 
works, but still he had to write because to write was the way in which to ex-
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press his self to the Other and so live his life. In conclusion, the concept of the 
Other, one of the key concepts both in existentialism in the sphere of philoso-
phy and in strucuralism in the sphere of literary criticism will be very eﬀ ective 
in understanding the world of Richard Wright, which is of course his own 
world, but at the same time ours.
In White Man, Listen!, Wright speaks of both his and the reader’s attitude of 
mind in order to understand the operations and structures of the world where 
Wright and his reader have their existence:
Th e basic assumption behind all so-called objective attitudes is this: If 
others care to assume my mental stance and, through empathy, duplicate 
the atmosphere in which I speak, if they can imaginatively grasp the fac-
tors in my environment and a sense of impulses motivating me, they 
will, if they are of a mind to, be able to see, more or less, what I’ve seen, 
will be capable of apprehending the same general aspects and tones of 
reality that comprise my world, that world that I share daily with all 
other men. By revealing the assumptions behind my statements, I’m 
striving to convert you to my outlook, to its essential humaneness, to the 
generality and reasonableness of my arguments. (77–78)
Unexpectedly, here Richard Wright himself veriﬁ es the thesis of this paper; 
this assertion of Wright’s, in fact, will help to make a great step toward conced-
ing the contention and conclusion of this paper. All of the things surrounding 
Wright’s life, literature, and philosophy will be elucidated from the standpoint 
of the Other, which is organically born of Wright’s existentialism. Richard 
Wright was a writer who knew well that writing was not to form an insouciant 
relationship with readers as representations of the Other, but to embark on an 
arduous relationship with them. Th e greatest act Richard Wright was capable 
of performing was to praise his life lived together with the Other; in spite of 
his being aware of the worst forms of existence of life, he made the enormous 
eﬀ ort of overcoming them and still found life positive.
It might be supposed that the Other brings about a change in the relation-
ship between Wright and the reader, the change which might be slight but 
sure, through naturally stimulating the reader to identify himself or herself 
with one of those Other who undergird both Wright’s literary world and his 
overwhelming self. Th e formative Other can be a tiny neuron, which will 
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carry some information of Wright’s body, brain, and writings to the reader and 
enable the reader to rewire parts of the variable relationships between Wright 
and the reader.
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